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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BILLIE R. GILL,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Petitioner/Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH E. FERRERI,
Respondent/Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 20030249-CA
District Court Case No. 034600040
Priority No. 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Respondent/Appellant, Joseph E. Ferreri, (respondent) submits the following as his brief
in the above matter:
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to review the trial court's judgment and order, which is the domestic violence
protective order, is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated. §78-2a-3(2)(h).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a final judgment and order granting a domestic violence
protective order.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court have sufficient evidence and make sufficient factual findings

to support its conclusion that respondent committed abuse and that a substantial likelihood
existed that abuse would occur again, warranting the entry of a protective order?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES
The issues are determined pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse Act, §§30-6-1 to 14 Utah
Code Ann., (1953 as amended).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete
County, State of Utah.
The parties were husband and wife, having married on August 19, 2000. The parties
separated on or about November 27, 2000. On or about August 5 and 8, 2002, the parties'
divorce action was tried to the bench. The same judge eventually tried the protective order
petition at issue in this case. The parties were divorced pursuant to a decree entered January
22, 2003. During the time period between their separation and the divorce trial, the parties
developed a history of difficulties in exercising parent-time. In its findings, the court
characterized as venom on petitioner's part and "frustration" on respondent's part. See
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 36, attached as Exhibit "A." The court
recalled this characterization during the protective order trial. See Tr. 2/19/03, p. 24, II. 4-7.
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On February 14, 2003, petitioner filed a pro se verified ex-parte petition for a protective
order. Petitioner claimed that on February 13, 2003, the evening before, respondent had
assaulted her while dropping off the parties' child after exercising parent-time. Specifically,
petitioner claimed that respondent reached in through the door when her back was turned and
slammed her head into a piece of furniture next to the door. Then she claimed respondent left.
See Verified Petition for Protective Order, attached as Exhibit "B."
The protective order was tried before the bench on February 19, 2003. The court
entered a protective order with the sole provision that "the respondent is restrained from
attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse of domestic violence against petitioner."
Protective Order, paragraph 1, attached as Exhibit "C."
The court, upon entering the protective order, did not make a specific finding of fact, nor
did the trial court find that abuse had occurred. Instead, the court simply stated:
You [petitioner] have an obvious injury. Ah, I have diametrically opposed
testimony. What I'm asked to do is to decide whether or not to enter a protective
order. That's a - cautionary device to prevent trouble in the future. I come
down on that side. I enter a protective order, ah, adjoining restraining the
respondent from attempting, committing, or threatening to abuse or domestic
violence against the petitioner. Ah, that's the extent to which I'm entering a
protective order.
Tr. 2/19/03, p. 26, II. 13-21
Because the court entered a protective order without making findings that abuse had
occurred, respondent moved the court for a new trial on or about March 5, 2003.
The court issued an order denying respondent's motion for a new trial by stating:
The Court heard the competing versions [of the incident on February 13, 2003]
and concluded that petitioner's version was credible and that abuse had
occurred and that there was a substantial likelihood that abuse would occur
3

again. If the Court failed to articulate that clearly, it was inadvertent and the
failure is herein remedied. It would serve no useful purpose to rehear the
competing stories.
Order Denying Motion for New Trial attached as Exhibit "D."
Respondent appeals the entry of the protective order on the grounds that the court did
not have sufficient evidence to enter a protective order and did not make specific findings to
warrant the entry of a permanent protective order. Rather, the trial court entered a protective
order as a prophylactic measure, akin to a civil restraining order in a domestic case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were previously husband and wife. Tr.2/19/03, p. 6,1. 12. The marriage
was dissolved by a decree of divorce entered in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete
County, State of Utah, on January 23, 2003.
On or about February 14, 2003, petitioner/appellee (petitioner) filed a pro se verified exparte petition for a protective order. See Exhibit "B." In her petition, at paragraph 5, petitioner
alleged that on or about February 13, 2003, respondent threatened, attempted or caused the
following acts of domestic violence:
Joe [respondent] came to my home at 8 p.m. to drop Jaycee [the parties' child]
off. I took Jaycee from him, he was saying he wasn't taking Jaycee back to the
doctor. He wanted me to take the doctors [sic] card and I wouldn't. I set Jaycee
down and as I was coming up he grabbed the back of my head and slammed it
down on my wall tree by the door. He threw the card at me and left. I was
screaming, all 4 of my kids were screaming. I was cut above my eye and it was
bleeding. I imediately [sic] called 911. The police then came and took my
statement and pictures.
At paragraph 6, petitioner, in response to an opportunity on the petition to describe other
acts of abuse or domestic violence by respondent, stated:
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He has beat [sic] my boys. Killed cats beat his first wife. He has had a
pschiatric [sic] profil [sic] done which states he has violent outbursts. He has
tried to break in to my home. He has taken pictures through my windows. He
has been arrested for tresspassing [sic]. He has tried to hire people to beat me
up. He has tried to hire people to beat my fiance.
The accusations of abuse listed in paragraph 6 refer to the numerous and
unsubstantiated allegations of abuse that petitioner has made against respondent in the past.
None of these accusations have resulted in the entry of previous protective orders, criminal
convictions, or findings of abuse by a court.
On or about February 14, 2003, the court entered an ex-parte protective order against
respondent with only one provision. That provision was contained in paragraph 1, as follows:
"The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse or
domestic violence against Petitioner."
The testimony and evidence in the divorce trial covered the same accusations that petitioner
made in paragraph 6 of her ex-parte petition for protective order.
However, the court made no finding that respondent had committed domestic violence
against petitioner either during the parties' marriage or during the pendency of the divorce
proceedings. The testimony and evidence in the divorce trial did, though, demonstrate
petitioner's animosity toward respondent in providing parent-time with the parties' minor child.
At paragraph 26 in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court states:
With respect to [petitioner] particularly early in Jaycee's life, the court finds
indications that [petitioner] made less than adequate effort, and demonstrated
unwillingness to encourage meaningful contact between Jaycee and
[respondent]. Also she made less than adequate effort and demonstrated
unwillingness to help [respondent] develop a meaningful relationship with
Jaycee.
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See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit "A."
At paragraph 27 in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found:
The first incident that the court characterizes as [petitioner's] not allowing
[respondent] to have meaningful contact, nor helping [petitioner] develop a
meaningful relationship with Jaycee concerns [petitioner's] behavior surrounding
Jaycee's birth. . . The court finds inexcusable her response to the court order,
and her response to the court-ordered obligation.
See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit "A."
At paragraph 26 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found:
If the court had not found a softening of this kind of attitude by the [petitioner], if
the court believed that [petitioner's] behavior would persist in the future and there
were no evidence of her softening, that would be large in the court's view and be
clearly unacceptable.
See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit "A."
At paragraph 29 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found:
[Respondent] has had the attitude that without a mutually agreed-upon parenttime schedule, there could be no duty. The court finds this to be erroneous,
there is an on-going duty to foster contact between parent and child.
See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit "A."
At paragraph30 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found:
"[Petitioner's] behavior was further inexcusable when she proceeded with the blessing of
Jaycee without notifying [petitioner]."
At paragraph 36 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found petition
had a "level of venom" toward respondent and that respondent had grown frustrated."
At paragraph 32 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in reference to an
MMPI administered by Dr. Katherine Kair, the custody evaluator appointed to evaluate the
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parties in the case, the court found: "[Respondent], during the course of the parties' relationship
has tended to be controlling and has exhibited some of the traits revealed by an M M P I . . .
Regarding his parent-time, [respondent] has exhibited some outbursts of anger and acting out
on some occasions. However, the court does not find that any of those instances, particularly
anything recent, was controlling behavior because of the recent vintage of behavior arose out of
[respondent's] frustration of his meaningful contact with his child."
On or about February 19, 2003, the petition for protective order came on for an
evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Kay L. Mclff, the same judge who heard the parties'
divorce case. The testimony showed that the alleged incidence of domestic violence occurred
surrounding a parent-time exchange. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 7. The trial court was familiar with the
parties and with the history of parent-time difficulties. The court had presided over the divorce
trial only six months before. At the protective order trial,. The court referred to its findings of
fact from the divorce trial. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 24.
Regarding the alleged domestic violence incident, the evidence showed that before the
incident took place, the parties had argued on the telephone concerning a medical issue
concerning the child. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 8. Furthermore, the parties disagreed over parent-time.
The testimony showed that earlier in the day, petitioner had called the police and had reported
that respondent had failed to bring the child back. She wanted to know if the police could do
anything. Tr. 2/19/03, pp. 10-11. However, respondent testified that the parent-time that he
had exercised was within the parent-time contemplated by the parties' Decree of Divorce. Tr.
2/19/03, p. 17.
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At the time of the incident, petitioner testified that she was home alone with her children
who were all in another room and when respondent came to the door. Petitioner testified that
respondent was talking about taking the child to the doctor and tried to hand petitioner a card.
Petitioner didn't want to take the card. She sat the child down and as she stood back up, the
respondent grabbed her head and slammed it into a piece of furniture near the door. Tr.
2/19/03, pp. 7-8. Petitioner testified that she had received a cut on her head as a result that
resulted from respondent slamming her head into the furniture Tr. 2/19/03, p. 9.
Respondent testified the visitation involved his taking the child for two days of parenttime pursuant to the decree of divorce. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 14. Respondent testified that petitioner
told him that if he ever took the child for two days in a row, she would have him arrested. Tr.
2/19/03, p. 14. Respondent testified that when he walked through the door to give petitioner
the child, the petitioner had a hat pulled down over her eyes and her head was down. Tr.
2/19/03, p. 15. Respondent testified he handed petitioner the child and a business card and
she said nothing to him. Petitioner took the child and respondent left immediately. Respondent
was in a karate class approximately twenty minutes later in a town approximately twenty
minutes away. Tr. 2/19/03, pp. 19-20. Another witness confirmed that respondent was in a
karate class approximately twenty minutes after the alleged incident and that respondent's
demeanor was calm and he was not upset. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 21.
The court decided to enter a protective order against respondent in petitioner's favor
stating:
Well, it sure is apparent to everyone that I have a pretty tough job deciding what
the truth is with when I have statements like that heard. But I have had enough
history with these folks to know about the aggravation and the frustration and,
8

ah, I'm satisfied that there has been incidents where frustration has been acted
upon. You have an obvious injury. Ah, I have diametrically opposed testimony.
What I'm asked to do is to decide whether or not to enter a protective order.
That's a - a cautionary device to prevent trouble in the future. I come down on
that side. I enter a protective order, ah, adjoining restraining the respondent
from attempting, committing or threatening to abuse or domestic violence
against the petitioner. Ah, that's the extent to which I'm entering a protective
order.
Tr. 2/19/03, p. 26.
The only provision the court entered in the protective order is paragraph 1, "respondent
is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence
against petitioner." Protective Order, paragraph 1, attached as Exhibit "C."
The court in admonishing the respondent stated:
I just want to make it clear that no matter how frustrated, no matter how angry,
you don't touch, you don't respond out of anger or frustration. You walk away.
You tell me that's what you did, I'm forced to make a decision. I've made it.
That's the extent of the - the protective order.
Tr. 2/19/03, p. 27.
Respondent brought a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the court did not enter
findings of fact, but simply entered the protective order on the ground that the protective order
statute allows for the entry of a protective order only if domestic violence or abuse has
occurred; and that the court did not find that respondent had committed domestic violence
against petitioner. The court simply decided to enter a protective order under the legal basis
that a protective order is "a cautionary device to prevent trouble in the future." In denying the
petitioner's motion for a new trial, the court said it had heard the competing versions and
concluded that petitioner's version was credible and that abuse had occurred and there was a
substantial likelihood that abuse would occur again. If the court failed to articulate that clearly,
9

it was inadvertent and the failure is herein remedied and would serve no useful purpose to
rehear the competing stories. The motion for a new trial is denied and the protective order
remains in force. Order Denying Motion for New Trial, Exhibit "D."
Respondent brought this appeal. See Notice of Appeal, attached as Exhibit "E."
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court entered a protective order against respondent without making adequate
findings or having sufficient evidence before it that domestic violence had occurred.
The parties had a history of disputes over parent-time, of which the trial court was
familiar. The trial court had tried the parties' divorce case over six months before trying the
protective order case.
Also, the petitioner had accused respondent of abuse in the past, but none of the
accusations had resulted in the entry of protective orders, criminal convictions, or findings of
abuse.
The testimony of concerning the alleged incident of domestic violence was, essentially,
a he-said/she-said account with no witnesses present. The court, in entering a protective order,
did not make specific findings of fact, nor even specifically find domestic violence had, in fact,
occurred. Instead, the court entered an order restraining respondent from abusing petitioner
and implied that it entered the order as a prophylactic measure. The court entered conclusory
findings only after respondent moved the court for a new trial. The Court of Appeals should
grant respondent's appeal and vacate the protective order because it's entry was clearly
erroneous.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND FAILED TO
MAKE SUFFICIENT FACTUAL FINDINGS IN ENTERING A PROTECTIVE
ORDER AGAINST RESPONDENT.
The trial court's entry of a protective order was based upon its finding that "petitioner's
version [of the events of February 13, 2003] was credible and that abuse had occurred and that
there was a substantial likelihood that abuse would occur again." Order Denying Motion for
New Trial, attached as Exhibit "D." A court's finding of fact is reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard of review. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, 15. When challenging a trial
court's findings, "an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to
be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Jd. (citing in
re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). Regarding the protective order, whether
the trial court's decision to grant a petition for domestic violence protective order will be upheld
if it is supported by either the trial court's specific findings or the undisputed evidence. See
Bailey v. Bavles. 2001 Ut. App. 34, 10.
Petitioner, in filing for a protective order, sought assistance from the trial court under
Chapter 6, Title 30, the Cohabitant Abuse Act, §§30-6-1 to 14 Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.2(1 )(b)
Utah Code Ann. gives the court authority to enter a protective order against a respondent after
a hearing upon notice, "if it appears from a petition for an order for protection . . . that domestic
violence or abuse has occurred." In the instant case, the court entered a protective order in
favor of petitioner against respondent after an evidentiary hearing. However, the evidence
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presented at the hearing was not sufficient to sustain a protective order, nor did it apparently
even convince the judge that domestic violence had occurred.
In marshaling the evidence, the evidence in favor of the entry of a protective order
includes that petitioner testified that on February 13, 2003, respondent brought the parties' child
back from visitation at 8:00 p.m. Tr. 2/19/03, p.7. Respondent was talking about taking the
child to the doctor and tried to hand petitioner a business card. Petitioner testified that the
parties had argued earlier in the day about taking the child to a doctor. ]dL Petitioner did not
want to take the card. She sat the child down and as she stood back up, respondent grabbed
her head and slammed it into a piece of furniture, jd. Petitioner testified she received a cut on
her head as a result of respondent's assault. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 9. Petitioner then called 911 Tr.
2/19/03, p. 9.
Respondent testified that the parties were having a visitation dispute earlier in the day.
Tr. 2/19/03, pp. 10-11. Petitioner had called the police on respondent for his failure to bring the
child back when she thought he should; and she asked the police if there was anything they
could do about it. Tr. 2/19/03, pp. 10-11.
Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination
indicates that the trial court believed respondent abused petitioner.
Other evidence weighed against the court's decision. The visitation and doctor dispute
could have convinced the court that petitioner was frustrated with respondent, so accused him
of domestic violence because, otherwise the police would not assist her.
Furthermore, although petitioner testified that the children were present in the home
when the alleged incident occurred, she testified that none of the children were present in the
12

room when respondent came to the door to drop the child off on the visitation exchange.
Therefore, no one, other than the parties themselves witnessed the exchange. Tr. 2/19/03, pp.
7-8. Also, respondent testified that petitioner had told him that if he ever took the child for two
days in a row he would have him arrested; Tr. 2/19/03, p. 14; and the evidence showed that the
police did nothing when petitioner called them to complain about her claim that respondent had
violated the visitation order.
Respondent testified that when he came to the door at 8:00 p.m., petitioner had a hat
over her eyes and her head was down. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 15. Petitioner could have received the
cut at another time. Respondent testified that he gave petitioner a business card and left.
Then he went straight to a karate class approximately twenty minutes away Tr. 2/29/03, pp. 1920. Counsel suggested on cross-examination that after petitioner called the police, the police
came immediately, but there was no evidence to that effect. Respondent's friend who also
attended the karate class said that she saw respondent at the class at approximately 8:20 p.m.
and his demeanor was calm and he was not upset Tr. 2/19/03, p.21.
Although petitioner said that the injury visible on her forehead at the time of trial came
from respondent's assault, no proof, other than her statement, was presented to the trial court.
The testimony came down, essentially, to a he-said/she-said argument. Credibility was
an issue in the protective order trial. It was uncontroverted that no one witnessed the alleged
assault. The petitioner testified that she received an injury. Respondent said that there was a
hat pulled down over her eyes, implying that the injury could have been received earlier from
another event, not from anything he did. The history of the parties, as the court reflected,
showed a history of "venom of petitioner against respondent and respondent's frustration."
13

However, despite this history, recorded in the findings of fact and recalled by the judge, there
was no finding that respondent had ever physically abused petitioner in the past.
The trial court, in making its order, did not reflect particular conviction that respondent
had committed domestic violence against petitioner or that the assault actually took place. The
trial court did not make any specific finding that domestic violence had taken place, or that there
was a substantial likelihood that petitioner would suffer from abuse in the future. Despite the
urging by petitioner's counsel that respondent be prohibited from going to the petitioner's home
for parent-time exchanges, the court declined to make any modifications of the divorce decree
pertaining to parent-time and did not restrict respondent's access in the protective order, Tr.
2/19/03, pp. 25-26. Nor did the trial court enjoin respondent in any way from contacting the
petitioner. The only provision of the protective order that the court entered against respondent
was that the court restrained respondent from "attempting, committing or threatening to commit
abuse or domestic violence against petitioner." This is no different than the injunction that
every member of the public is always under. No member of the public may commit abuse or
domestic violence against anyone.
After saying it was a tough job deciding what the truth was and the testimony was
diametrically opposed, the court continued with, "what I'm asked to do is to decide whether or
not to enter a protective order." Tr. 2/19/03, p. 26. The court then stated its view that "that's [a
protective order] a cautionary device to prevent trouble in the future." id. Apparently, the trial
court believed that a domestic violence protective order is in the nature of a civil restraining
order in a divorce case. It is but a prophylactic measure designed to prevent trouble rather than
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an order entered to protect the petitioner against future domestic violence based upon the
domestic violence petitioner, in fact, already suffered.
As stated by the appellate court, the purpose of the Cohabitant Abuse Act was to
"create a timely and simplified process whereby some level of protection and safety could be
afforded to victims who had previously been outside the umbrella of orders available to persons
involved in criminal prosecutions. These orders would require that the parties subject to the
order of protection leave the victim alone and provide some measurable and enforceable
safeguards, ascertained by the court. Bailey vs. Bavles, 2001 Ut. App. 34, at n.4.
In the instant case, the court did not, upon conclusion of the evidence, enter findings of
fact, nor did it enter any specific protection to protect petitioner who supposedly was a victim of
abuse. Instead, the court simply entered a protective order prohibiting respondent from
committing domestic violence against petitioner and did not enter any other protective
provisions. The court further commented that the purpose of the protective order was to
prevent future problems. Finally, the court warned respondent not to act out his frustrations in a
violent manner. However, the court recognized that respondent did not, in fact, act out his
frustrations violently. The court said when it told respondent just to walk away from petitioner
and problems occurred, "You tell me that is what you did." TR 2/19/03, p. 27.
Because respondent believed that the court had entered the protective order without
findings of fact and on an incorrect legal standard-the same standard the court would use in a
civil restraining order-the respondent filed a motion for a new trial. The court denied the
motion. The court entered the findings that the court had heard conflicting versions and
concluded that petitioner's version was credible and that abuse had occurred and that there
15

was a substantial likelihood that abuse would occur again. If the court failed to articulate that
clearly, it was inadvertent and the failure is herein "remedied." These findings are insufficient to
support the entry of a protective order against respondent. The findings of the court were
clearly erroneous and the protective order should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
The trial court entered a protective order without sufficient evidence and without
adequate findings apparently as a prophylactic measure to "prevent trouble in the future." This
is inadequate and clearly erroneous. The protective order should be vacated.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ft

day of August, 2003.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.

MM
Attorney far Respondent/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 26th day of August, 2003,1 caused two
copies of the foregoing opening brief of appellant to be mailed, postage pre-paid, to:
DOUGLAS NEELEY
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
100 South Main Street, Suite 205
Post Office Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642

MARY
Attorne or Respondent/Appellant
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EXHIBIT "A"

DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290
Attorney for Respondent
1st South Main, Suite 205
P.O. Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435)835-5055
Facsimile: (435)835-5057
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH E. FERRERI
Petitioner,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT &
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
Civil No. 004600178

vs.

:

BILLIE RAE FERRERI

:

Respondent.

JUDGE K.L. McIFF

:

A trial in the above-entitled matter came on regularly on August 5th and August 8,2002, the
Honorable K.L. Mclff, District Court Judge, presiding. Petitioner appeared in person and through
his counsel, Mary Cline, Corporon & Williams, P.C. Respondent appeared in person and through
her counsel, Douglas L. Neeley. The Court, having reviewed and approved the stipulations of the
parties, having heard the testimony of witnesses and arguments of counsel, having reviewed the
documents entered into evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, now hereby enters the
following:

Ferreri v Ferreri
Findings of Fact &
Conclusions
Page 2

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties are husband and wife, having been married on the 19th day of August, 2000.
The parties separated on November 22, 2000.
2. The parties are both residents of Sanpete County, State of Utah, and have been for at least
three months before the commencement of this action.
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties making the continuation of their
marriage impossible.
4. There has been one (1) child bom as issue of the marriage, namely, Jaycee Ferreri, whose
date of birth is June 5, 2001.
5. The parties stipulate that so long as Petitioner remains employed by Central Utah
Correctional Facility, he should maintain medical insurance on Jaycee's behalf; and he should pay
Jaycee's portion of the health insurance premium.
6. The parties stipulate to dividing equally Jaycee's medical, dental, orthodontic, and
psychotherapeutic expenses not covered by insurance.
7. The parties stipulate that Petitioner should pay the cost of Respondent's work-related day
care not otherwise provided by Petitioner, himself, or by a family member.
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8 The parties stipulate that the Court should award each of them the real property each
brought into the marriage and that is titled in their respective names, subject to any encumbrances
thereon.
9. The parties stipulate that each should retain the personal property that was in their own
possession at the time of the trial.
10. The parties stipulate the Court should award each party his or her own bank and financial
accounts held in their own names.
11. The parties stipulate the ( onrt should award each party his or her own retirement or
pension account that may have accumulated during the parties' marriage.
12. The parties stipulate the Court should award each party the motor vehicle in his or her
own possession at the time of the trial, subject to any indebtedness thereon.
13. The parties stipulate that there are no marital debts.
14. The parties stipulate that each should assume and pay, and hold the other party harmless
from, their own respective debts incurred in their own names.
15. The parties stipulate the Court should award each of them Jaycee's dependency
exemption, for the purposes of calculating state and federal income taxes, on an alternate, annual
basis. The Court should award Petitioner Jaycee's dependency exemption in even-numbered tax
years. The Court should award Respondent Jaycee's dependenc} exemption in odd-number tax
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years. The Court should order the parties to cooperate fully in providing the necessary tax
documents for each party to claim Jaycee's dependency exemption in the year in which each has
been awarded it.
16. Before the parties married, they resided together as a couple. After the parties began
living together, and throughout their marriage, the parties commingled their assets, except that
Respondent received a 530,000 personal injury settlement as her separate property. The parties
established, with $5,000 from the settlement, a separate account subject to Petitioner's control and
was utilized on his home which he is awarded. The Court should award Respondent a credit of
$5,000, or the amount of her separate, pre-marital money that she put into the account used for
Petitioner's home.
17. Respondent sold her Centerfield home and the buyer gave Respondent a down-payment.
Petitioner immediately funneled $2,000 from the down-payment to purchase appliances for
Petitioner's Manti home. The Court should award Respondent a credit of $2,000 for the appliances.
18. Respondent purchased a four-wheeler on credit, then transferred the four-wheeler to a
sibling who promised to make the payments on the four-wheeler debt. However, the sibling did not
make the payments in a timely fashion, and the delinquency threatened Respondent's credit.
Petitioner borrowed $2,500, in his own name and used the money to satisfy the four-wheeler debt,
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in order to protect Respondent's credit. The Court should award Petitiorici a credit in the amount
of $2,500, ior the amount he borrowed to satisfy the four-wheeler debt.
19. All the parties' other assets and incomes were commingled during the marriage and used
for family purposes, and therefore, are not subject to any further credit or debit.
20. Petitioner is employed at Central Utah Correctional Facility, earning a gross monthly
income of $2,891. Respondent is employed at $6.65 fvj

IIOUJU

works 40 hours per week for 4.3

weeks per month, and produces $1,144 monthly gross income. The parties' combined gross monthly
income totals $4,035 per month. Petitioner earns 72% of that amount, and Respondent earns 28%.
Based on these figures, Petitioner should pay Respondent $340 per month as base child support,
which shall continue until said child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years or graduates from high
school during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs last. Universal
Income Withholding does apply pursuant to UCA §62A-11-501 (1953 as amended). All payment:
should be made through the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84145-0011. This income withholding procedure shall apply to existing and future payors. A child
support worksheet is attached as Exhibit A.
21. The parties underwent a custody evaluation; and the custody evaluator testified at trial
Petitioner paid the up-front cost of the custody evaluation, with the final allocation of the custody
evaluation to be determined at the time of the trial. It is appropriate and reasonable to apportion the
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custody evaluation according to the parties' respective contributions to their combined gross monthly
income. Consequently, the Court should order Petitioner to pay 72% and should order Respondent
to pay 28% of the cost of the custody evaluation.
22. Respondent asked the Court to award her her reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The
Court finds both parties have over-used legal proceedings. The parties grossly overused public
resources for law enforcement personnel to monitor parent-time exchanges, for pleadings filed, and
claims advanced; for summoning law officers to appear in Court; and by filing multiple protective
orders and multiple orders to show cause, and by bringing multiple criminal charges. On the other
hand, the Court declines to find that all of the proceedings were unnecessary.
23. Both Petitioner and Respondent requested sole custody of Jaycee. The Court appointed
Kathryn Kair, Ph.D., to perform a custody evaluation on the parties and the child. Dr. Kair met with
both parties and prepared a report. She submitted the report to the Court, and it was filed with the
Court on July 15, 2002. Dr. Kair recommended that the Court award the parties joint legal custody
and joint physical custody on a 50/50 time-sharing arrangement. The Court finds pluses and minuses
as to each of the parties as it relates to past conduct involving the child. At first blush, it would
appear, and the evaluator found, that the Petitioner was more likely to foster that. There are two (2)
difficulties the Court has with this finding. The onh real track record relates to Respondent.
Petitioner has never been in a position to where he has been called upon to facilitate and encourage
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frequent contact. Both parties have come into court and said they are willing to facilitate and
encourage contact by the other party with the child. The Court does not find a track record with the
Petitioner in this respect. The Court finds with respect to Respondent some early indications of less
than adequate, meaningful contact and willingness to foster the development of relationship.
24. No significant proof changed the moral standards of the parties.
25. The Court finds from the evidence that there are pluses and minuses as it relates to past
conduct involving the child. The custody evaluator testified that both parties' parenting skills were
above average, both parties demonstrated a high i ommitment level and interest in the child, and each
party demonstrated a capacity to parent the child. The custody evaluator testified that Petitioner was
more likely than Respondent to allow Jaycee to have frequent and continuing contact with
Respondent. However, the only actual custodial experience during the time period preceding the
trial relates to Respondent's behavior regarding frequent and continuing contact with Petitioner.
Petitioner has never been in a position in which he has been called upon to encourage Jaycee's
frequent and continuing contact with Respondent. Both parties expressed a willingness in the future
to allow Jaycee frequent contact with the other party, and to allow the other party's relationship with
Jaycee to develop.
26. With respect to Respondent, particularly early in Jaycee's life, the Court finds indications
that Respondent made less-than-adequate effort, and demonstrated unwillingness to encourage
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meaningful contact between Jaycee and Petitioner. Also she made less-than-adequate effort an,
demonstrated an unwillingness to help Petitioner develop a meaningful relationship with Jaycee.
27. The first incident that the Court characterizes as Respondent's not allowing Petitioner
to have meaningful contact, nor helping Petitioner develop a meaningful relationship with Jaycee,
concerns Respondent5 s behavior surrounding Jaycee's birth. By court order, Petitioner was entitled
to notification and participation in Jaycee's birth. However, Respondent failed to notify Petitioner
of the birth, and Respondent denied Petitioner participation. The Court finds inexcusable her
response to the court order, and to her response to her court-ordered obligation. Part of Respondent's
family found out about the birth of Jaycee on the night of the birth. The rest of Respondent's family
found out about the birth the next day. However, the Court finds it indefensible on Respondent's
part that Petitioner found out about the birth through the grapevine, and he was forced to follow up
with calls to the hospital to verify the information. Respondent's testimony that she asked her
mother to call Petitioner, or that she expected the doctor to notify Petitioner, was inadequate to
comply with the Court's order. The Court finds someone could have gotten the message through to
Petitioner and it was Respondent's responsibility that someone should have done so.
28. If the Court had not found a softening of this kind of attitude by the Respondent. If the
Court believed that Respondent's behavior would persist in the future, and there were no evidence
of her softening, that would loom large in the Court's view and be clearly unacceptable.
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29. The Court further finds that Respondent has the attitude tha4 w 11 hn ut *i m m ually agreedupon parent-time schedule, there can be no duty. The Court finds this view to be erroneous, there
is an ongoing duty to foster contact between child dnd paierii

When the parent-time schedule in

effect expired at the end of December, 2001, Petitioner prepared a new schedule and sought to
deliver it to Respoi ident on December 31, 2001. Respondent refused receipt of the schedule. The
Court does not have conclusive evidence that Respondent, in fact, knew the schedule was identified,
because Respondent refused to accept any paper from Petitioner. When Petitioner arrived on January
4, 2002, Respondent refused to answer the dooi btxause no schedule was then in force. However,
Respondent's refusal to allow any contact further frustrated an adoption of a schedule.
30. Respondent's behavior was further inexcusable when she proceeded with the blessing
of Jaycee without notifying Petitioner. Respondent was not entitled to proceed with the child's
blessing without Petitioner's knowledge. The Court weighs those roadblocks against factors found
to run the other way.
31. The Court however, must weigh these roadblocks by the Respondent against factors that
the Court finds funs the other way.
32. Petitioner, himself, also created some obstacles to the fostering of Respondent's
relationship with Jaycee. Petitioner, during the course of the parties' relationship has tended to be
controlling and has exhibited some of the traits revealed b\ an MMPI administered by Dr. Kathryn
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Kair. Page three of the report described the results of the test, and the Court finds Petitioner has
exhibited some of those traits. Regarding his parent-time, Petitioner has exhibited some outbursts
of anger and acting out on some occasions. However, the Court does not find that any of those
instances, particularly anything recent, were controlling behavior because of the recent vintage of
behavior arose out of Petitioner's frustration of his meaningful contact with his child. Nevertheless,
these events need to be and are weighted by the Court and are not as favorable as the Respondent's
results for the test and her exhibited behavior.
33. Respondent's responses to the same MMPI test demonstrate a more even temperament
and is not inclinated to act out in the same manner as Petitioner.
34. The Court finds that the relationship of Jaycee to her siblings is important, but it does
not outweigh the father's relationship with the child, but it is a plus for the Respondent.
35. The Court finds that it is beneficial to have extended family support, but that support
should not get in the way of Petitioner's relationship with the child. Respondent has extended family
support that is beneficial to the child and a plus for the Respondent. If, in the future, Petitioner
becomes before the Court and demonstrates that Respondent's extended family substantially
interferes with his parent-time, the Court will not tolerate such behavior.
36. The Court finds Respondent's level of venom, and Petitioner's frustration, has subsided
during recent months, and the parties have demonstrated more cooperation. This cooperation is
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shown by the parties' relaxing the requirement that law enforcement be involved in their parent-time
exchange1- I a w v n i - > rcement involvement has become a hindrance to the parties-not because of any
failing on the officers'part. The officers have mini." worl ind-. Monitoring the parties'parent-time
has become an undue burden for the officers, and the burden does not produce a corresponding
benefit to the parties. Therefore, the parties themselves have recognized that involvement by the
police is unnecessary. On the other hand, the evidence of the last few months reveals that the
parties' willingness to have a more cooperative relationship, but is still not at a level sufficient
enough for them to work out the joint custody parenting plan as contemplated and required by §30-310.8 Utah Code Ann. The Court finds that the current environment for the 15 month-old child is a
good environment and it is stable. The Court finds that Respondent has been the custodial parent
and has provided the primary care setting for Jaycee. The Court iIn

that Petitioner sometimes

works two (2) days in a row, sometimes he works three (3) days in a row, and sometimes he works
four (4) days in a row. The Court finds that Petitioner sometimes has two (2) days off in a row,
sometimes he has three (3) days off, and sometimes he has four (4) days off.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes its:
CONCLUSIONS Ut LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and their divorce.
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2. The parties should be divorced on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the decree
should become final upon entry.
3. Petitioner should maintain and pay for medical, dental, orthodontic, optometric and
psychotherapeutic insurance on behalf of the child. Uncovered medical expenses should be divided
equally between the parties. The decree should include statutory provisions governing notice of
insurance and requests for reimbursement.
4. To the extent surrogate care is used, but not provided by either parent or family member,
Petitioner should pay for such surrogate care necessitated by the parties' work schedule.
5. Each party should be awarded the real property that each has respectively brought into the
marriage and is titled in their own name, subject to any indebtedness thereon.
6. Each party should retain the personal property that was in their own possession at the time
of the trial.
7. Each party should be awarded his or her own bank and financial accounts held in his or
her own respective name.
8. Each party should be awarded their own retirement or pension accounts that may have
accumulated during the parties' marriage.
9. Each party should be awarded the motor vehicle in his or her own possession at the time
of trial, subject to any indebtedness thereon.
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10. The parties have no marital debt.
11. Each party should assume and pay, and hold the other party harmless from, their own
respective debts, incurred in their own names.
12. Each party should be entitled to claim Jaycee's dependency exemption for the purpose
of calculating state and federal income ta;,\ on a alternate, annual basis. Petitioner should be entitled
to claim Jaycee's dependency exemption in even-numbered tax years R espondent should be entitled
to claim Jaycee's dependency exemption in odd-numbered tax years. Each party should cooperate
fully in providing necessary tax documents for each party to claim,, Jaycee's dependency exemption
in the year in which each has been awarded it.
13. Petitioner she

eimburse Respondent $4,500 as the net result of each parties'

respective credit and debit of separate funds each contributed during the marriage.
14. Petitioner should pay Respondent the base child support amount of $340 per month
according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The decree should include the statutory child
support provisions. Said support should be paid through the Office of Recovery Services.
15. Each party should pay the cost of the custody evaluation at the rate of 72% for Petitioner,
and 28% for Respondent.
16. Each party should pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs.
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17. The statute governing child custody is contained at §30-3-10 Utah Code Ann. Section
30-3-10(l)(a) Utah Code Ann. The statute requires the Court to consider the child's best interest in
determining custody. Joint legal and joint physical custody cannot be awarded because joint legal
and joint physical custody are not in Jaycee's best interest.
18. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10(a) also requires the Court to consider, in determining custody,
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each party. No significant evidence
challenged the moral standards of either party. In considering the past conduct of the parties, the
Court concludes both parties have positives and negatives.
19. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10(2) requires the Court consider which parent is most likely to
act in the best interest of the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact witl:
the noncustodial parent. The Court concludes both parties will allow frequent and continuing contaci
with the other parent, and each party will act in the best interest of the child.
20. Recognizing the stability, and the generally good environment provided by Responden:
in the primary care setting, the Court should award Respondent Jaycee's primary legal and physica
custody.
21. Petitioner should have parent-time as allowed by statute, as described for children both
under five and for five and older, as modified by the Court to conform with Petitioner's work
schedule.
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22. Whether Petitioner works the graveyard or day shift, fouiteen hours after Petitioner
finishes his work block, he may pick up Jaycee and take Jaycee home for visitation for 24 hours.
After Jaycee turns eighteen •:•..

vhen Petitioner has four days off in a row,

Petitioner may increase his parent-time to two (2) days (48 hours) at either 8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m.
On days when Petitioner has three days off in a row, Petitioner may have parent-time for one (1) day
(24) hours. This schedule should continue after Jaycee turns five (5) years old.
23. The Court should adopt the advisory guidelines contained at §30-3-33 Utah Code Ann.
The decree should note some guidelines in particular. Attached as Exhibit B is a copy of §30-3-33.
24. Petitioner should pick up Jaycee at Respondent's home unless she requests alternative
arrangements. Upon Respondent's giving Petitioner adequate notice that she wants Petitioner to pick
up Jaycee at a place other than her home, Petitioner should pick Jaycee up at the alternative place
iii ui return Jaycee to the same place from which he picked Jaycee up.
25. Petitioner's parent-time should not depend on his payment of child support, nor should
Respondent be allowed any other excuse for distrupting Petitioner's parent-time.
26. Petitioner should not interrupt child support payments because of disruptions in parenttime.
27. As set forth in §30-3-33(9) Utah Code .Ann., Respondent should notify' Petitioner within
24 hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social sports and community functions in
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which Jaycee is participating or being honored-this includes religious events such as blessings-and
Petitioner should be entitled to attend and participate fully.
28. Petitioner should have direct access to school records.
29. Each party must permit and encourage liberal telephone contact.
30. Parental care is presumed better than surrogate care. When Respondent is working and
Petitioner is not working, Petitioner may provide care, independent of his court-ordered parent-time.
The same is true for the Respondent when he needs day care. Respondent may continue to use
extended family for surrogate care when Petitioner is working or otherwise unavailable, but she may
not use extended family for surrogate care in preference to care by Petitioner.
31. The holiday schedule is set forth in §30-3-35 Utah Code Ann. If the holiday awarded
to Petitioner that year falls on Petitioner's scheduled parent-time day, Petitioner should be entitled
to that holiday day. If a holiday awarded to Petitioner that year does not fall on Petitioner's
scheduled parent-time day, the statutory holiday schedule should govern. Because of Petitioner's
alternating work schedule, the alternating weekends just don't work and the Court has done the best
it can. In this matter, those provisions just don't work due work. The Petitioner's visitation is the
best the Court can do given the blocked time off for the Petitioner.
32. After Jaycee turns five, extended summer parent-time should proceed according to
statute governing extended parent-time for children five (5) years old and older.
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33. Until Jaycee is five (5) years old, Petitioner should have as extended summer parenttime, .i ioi a 1 oi UM • i? \ weeks of summer parent-time. The two (2) weeks should be divided as two
(2) one-week-long periods separated by four (4) weeks unless the parties otherwise agree.
34 The Court should direct the parties to make every effort to accommodate reasonable
modification and changes in ; <. -: \ =-. •. : ue schedule through agreement. There are family trips and
functions or days that are not identified by the Court, but the parties should cooperate. They need
not compromise the extent of each parties' contact with Jaycee, but they should facilitate contact,
either in Petitioner or Respondent's favoi

Hit" OUT! shrill. I apply this strict parent-time formula

because of the parties' demonstrated difficulties in arranging parent-time.
35. Within 24 hours of receiving hei work schedule, Respondent should notify Petitioner of
her schedule by telephone or by facsimile. Respondent should not notify Petitioner by ordinary post.
Respondent should make sure she gets her schedule to Petitioner within 24 hours of her receiving
the schedule from her employer.
36. The parent-time schedule should begin Saturday morning, August 10,2002, at 8:00 a.m.
Petitioner should pick up Jaycee at Respondent's sister, Crystal's, house.
37. The Respondent's relatives are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. However, the
Court should not tolerate any bad-mouthing of the other party, swearing, or the use of expletives
about the other party. Because Jaycee is part of everyone's life, for the most of the child's life, the
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parties should find ways to accommodate each other. The parties should act like responsible
citizens. The parties should refrain from summoning police against each other, calling for security
against the other party while both parties are in a public place, and other such disniptive and
antagonistic conduct toward each other.
38. The surname of the child should be changed to "Ferreri" and a new birth certificate
should be issued.
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Petitioner's Name
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Address (may be omitted for privacy)
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Telephone (may be omitted)
., COUNTY, UTAH

DISTRICT COURT,.
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VERIFIED PETITION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

Petitioner,

CaseNo._03%0^yP

vs.

N,\oScph £- f e r r e t

Assigned Judge

^^miUA^

Respondent.

PETITIONER IS ADVISED THAT LYING TO OBTAIN A PROTECTIVE ORDER MAY BE
CONSIDERED A FELONY UNDER THE UTAH CODE.
The Petitioner alleges against the Respondent and states as follows:
1.

Either Petitioner or Respondent resides, or the acts occxirred, in this County.

2.

Neither party is the minor child (step, adoptive, or natural) of the other party

3.

Petitioner is 16 or older, or emancipated. Petitioner and Respondent have the following

relationship (check and circle all that apply):
arnsd; [divorced on:
•

\qc\

9*0-

)

O ^

]

[airremly living/have lived] as if mairied;
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related by blood or marriage, [describe relationship. £ y -

p^^An^

have one or more children together;

•

have an unborn child together;

D

[currently residmg/have resided] rn the same residence.

4.

Petitioner and Respondent are the parents of the following minor children:
BIRTH DATE

NAME

Florence,

\a\>o-cz ferreri

U-S-C3

ADDRESS

1$ U). \oo l)

Gf.f£crC:di

These minor children have resided at the following location^) for the past year (give the locations
and the dates at each location):

5.
On or about rk" ^ u
, 20 <03 the Respondent threatened, attempted, or
caused the following acts of abuse or domesnc violence. (Describe m detail what happened, where, who
was involved (including the minor children and family and household members), if weapons were involved,
and if injuries resulted Attach Continuation Sheets if necessary)
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The following is a description of other acts of abuse or domestic violence by Respondent

(Describe -with the same detail as above. Attach Continuation Sheets if necessary.)

yU. WAS W a i rv^jW^s. V-.UfcA <wk<, V,*^ K s
C;c«A

(We

u>.Pf..Ur,

uVK:cJh

VW L s

Vi^s

SVQW.S

W;<L.A

Wxd

CX p\>^;fAP^f>-

^rnC:\

\p< Vvas V.^icrH ca4bur<}s^

\n K r e . "^<Lnp\e. Vr. V > A 4 m e aft

S/2000

7.

Check one;

D no cases of any type involving Petitioner, Respondent and/or the others named in ibis petition
have been filed in any court.
Kihe following cases which involve Petitioner, Respondent and/orthe others named in this petition
have been filed in any court at any time:
Court or County where
case
filed

5a.fM^r^^
|\v

8.

?'

Type of Case (e.g. divorce, protective
order) Anil Case number (if known)

! t>;vjorrj*.
i &rf^A:\/d

orA-e/r

Has a judge signed an

order?
!

StS

1

^c<S

1

Thefollowingother cases have involved or currently involve Petitioner, Respondent and/or

the others named in this petition:
9.

I also request reliefforthefollowingiamtty and household members:

CXTN

WHEREFORE: I respectfully request thai this Court
1.

Order the Respondent to appear at a hearing,

2.

Immediately issue an Ex-Parte Protective Order and, after the hearing, issue a Protective

Order containing the following relief (Check boxes of relief that you are requesting):
J&
Restrain the Respondent from attempting, threatening or committing abuse or domestic
violence against Petitioner.
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)(
Restrain the Respondent from attempting, threatening or committing abuse or domestic
violence against the minor children and the designatedfenrilyand household members.
V
Prohibit the Respondent from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, or
otherwise communicating with the Petitioner.
D
Order the Respondent to vacate and stay away from the residence located at:
__
„
, and any
subsequent residence of Petitioner, and prohibit the Respondent from terminating or interfering
with die utility services to the residence.
V
Order the Respondent to stay ara^ from Petition^
and
other places frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and designated family or household
members. These places are identified by the following address(es):

D
Prohibit the Respondent from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or other weapon
as designated by the court, including:
D
Award possession of the following residence, automobile and/or other essential personal
effects:

Order a law enforcement officer to accompany Petitioner to the residence to ensure that
S>'2000

Petitioner is safely restored to possession of the listed items.
o
Order a law enforcement officer to supervise Respondent*s removal of essential personal
belongings from the residence.
D

Order Respondent to participate in an electronic monitoring program.

&
Order the Department of Child and Family Services to conduct an investigation into the
possibilities of child abuse.
tf

Appoint a Guardian ad Litem to represent fee best interests of the children,

3,
Include in the Protective Order the following temporary reliefwhich should be: in effect for
up to 150 days (explain in writing and attach if additional time will be necessary).
y/

Giant Petitioner custody of the minor chfld/ien.

if
Order the following visitation anangement (if requesting visitation arranged through, or
supervise&by, another person, state the name and phone number of thai person):
\

•

Restrain Respondent from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during visitation

Itf

Restrain Respondent from removing the minor child/ren from the state.

D
Order Respondent to pay child support m the amount of $
the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
X^

pursuant to

Order Respondent to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuant to Utah Code
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Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5.
D

Order Respondent to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's day care expenses.

D
Order Respondent to pay one-half of the minor child/reris medical expenses including
premiums, deductibles and co-payments.
•

Order Respondent to pay spousal support in the amount of $

„.

D
Order Respondent to pay Petitioner's medical expenses suffered as a result of abuse in the
amount of $
,
D
Order Respondent to pay the minor children's medical expenses suffered as a result of
abuse in the amount of $
.
O
Order any other relief that the court considers necessary for fee safety and welfare of
Petitioner, the children and designated household and family members, including:

DATED: 2~ \A-

D^
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State of Utah
County

)
( ss:
)

Being swam, I state that I am the Petitioner; that I have read this Petition and the statements in it
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge; that I believe I am entitled to the relief requested, and
that this Petition is not being used to harass or to abuse process.

Petitioner
Subscribed and sworn to befote.uxe on.

T^na?ldsfry\.
$*&' ;'

Clerk or Notary Public
.Residing at
My Commission Expires:

Serve Respondent at: \
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Qty, State, ZIP
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DISTRICT COURT,.

.COUNTY, UTAH

"vkxV..^ Q., &:l\

PROTECTIVE ORDER

Petitioner,
Case No.

CrhflpO&QctQ

vs.
Assigned Judge:
Respondent

This matter came forbearing on ^f.l
parties were in attendance:
y(^

Petitioner

)£^mm

Respondent

t j

\C> ^before the imdetsigned- The following

/
^/
Jff

Petitioner's attorney
Respondent's attorney

m

The Comr having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and:
/Chaving received argument and evidence,
.

having accepted the stipulation of the parties
having entered the default of the Respondent for Mure to appear

and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred,
TT IS HEREBY ORDERED PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE SECTION 30-64.2:
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial
each section that is included in this Order.)

t&M 1.

The Rcspondeni is restrainedficomattempting, commitiing, orthreatcning to commit abuse
or domestic violence against Petitioner.
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2.
The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse
or domestic violence against the following minor children and members of Petitioner's family or
household:

3.
The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning,
or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner.
4.
The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, from Petitioner's
residence, and its premises, located at:
and any subsequent residence of Petitioner, and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or
interfering with the utility services to the residence.
5.
The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of employment, and/or
other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and the designated
household and family members. These places are identified by the following addresses:

6.
The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose a
serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, or
possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s):

7.
The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, automobile and/or other
essential personal effects:
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This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic proceedings.

8.

An officer from the following law enforcement agency:
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner safely
regains possession of the awarded property.
9.
An officerfromthe same law enforcement agency shall facilitate Respondent's removal of
Respondent's essential personal belongings from the parties' residence. The law enforcement
officer shall contact Petitioner to make these arrangements. Respondent may not contact the
Petitioner or enter the residence to obtain any items.
10.
The Respondent is placed under the supervision of the Department of Corrections for the
purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the execution of this Order, the Department
of Corrections shall place an electronic monitoring device on Respondent and shall install
monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and in the residence of Respondent.
Respondent is ordered to pay to the Department of Corrections the costs of the electronic
monitoring required by this Order. The Department of Corrections shall have access to Petitioner's
residence to install the appropriate monitoring equipment.

RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS " 1 " THROUGH "10" OF THIS ORDER
IS A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 76-5-108.
IFRESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OFPROVISIONS " 1 " THROUGH "10" OF THIS ORDER
IS A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENSE, ENHANCED
PENALTIES MAY BE IMPOSED UNDER UTAH CODE SECTIONS 77-36-1.1 AND 77-36-2.4.

Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through "1") which will
(expire/be reviewed by the court)
days from the date of this order:
a.

The Petitioner is granted custody of the following minor children:

b.

Visitation shall be as follows:
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c.

The Respondent is restrainedfromusing drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during visitation.

d.
The Respondent is restrainedfromremoving the parties' minor child/renfromthe state of
Utah.
e.

The Respondent is ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amoimt of $
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.

f

The Respondent is ordered to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5.
g.

The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's day care expenses.

h.
The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's medical expenses
including premiums, deductibles and co-payments.
L
The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner spousal support in the amount of
$

.

j.
The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a result of the
abuse in the amount of $
.
k.
The Respondent is ordered to pay the minor child/ren's medical expenses, suffered as a
result of the abuse in the amount of S
.
1

Other:
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Violation of provisions "a" through "I" may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings.

11.
The Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation into the
allegation of child abuse.
12.

Other:

13.
Law enforcement agencies withjxmsdictionoverthepTOtectedlocationsshaUhave authority
to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly evict and restrain
Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification of the Respondent is
attached to the Appendix to this Order.
14.
Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that gave
rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, PL. 103-322,108 Stat 1976,
18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and
United States Territories.
15.
Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the remaining
provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the Petitioner should
provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made available to Respondent.
THE PETITIONER CANNOT WAIVE, ALTER OR DISMISS THIS ORDER WITHOUT
FURTHER COURT ACTION. EITHER PARTY MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR
IGNORING OR ALTERING THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER.

8/2000

DATED
BY THE COURT.

Recommended by.

Distnct Court Commissioner

Date

By thisjigijature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts sara/ice/
iCtive Order anH waives thff ngV
personally served. %

Serve Respondent at:

£ir^-~^m*~rrm

°^ , ' r>rT ^ c ^w v - tITAH
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i ye sad coned
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C~

I'

.20.
li^^RfcSHKKcCHT COUWTYCL2RK
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EXHIBIT "D"

DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY,sUTAH
160 North Main Street
Manti, UT 84642
Telephone- 435-835-2131 Fax 435-835-2135
————

--

Order denying motion for new trial

BillieRGill,

Case No. 034600040
vs.
Assigned Judge. K L Mclff
Joseph E Ferreri,
Respondent.

Respondent moves the Court for anew trial based upon the Court's failure to make a specific
finding of abuse.
The Court heard the competing versions and concluded that petitioner's version was credible
and that abuse had occurred and that there was a substantial likelihood that abuse would occur again.
If the Court failed to articulate that clearly, it was inadvertent and the failure is herein remedied. It
would serve no useful purpose to rehear the competing stories.
The motion for a new trial is denied and the protective order remains in force

Order denvine motion for new trial Case number 034600040. Page -2CEPvTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On April \ 1 , 2003 a copy of the above Order denying motion for new trial was sent to
each of the following by the method indicated:
Addressee

Method (M^mail, P^Tn person, F=Fax) Addressee

Douglas L Neeley
Attorney at Law
1st South Main, Suite 205
P O Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642

[P]

Method

(M^mail, P 8 ^ person, F-Fax)

Mary Cline
Attorney at Law
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

.VlfcirV

[M]

EXHIBIT "E"

FILFD
SANPcTE COUNTY. UTAH

2003 nay 13 RFI 1 1 1 5
Ko 1 r ~

' c '" •"' 1 c •** 1 •

•• .*« :j T-

SANPETE COUNTY CLERK

Mary Cline #5932
BY
.TVU^S^w DEPUTY
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C
Attorney for Respondent
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: 328-1162
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BOJER.GJLL,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Petitioner,
Civil No. 034600040
v,
Judge K . L McIU
JOSEPH B.FERRERI,
Respondent.

Pursuant to Rule 3 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respondent, Joseph E. Ferrcri, by
and through counsel, Mary Cline, Coiporon & Williams, P.C, appeals to the Court of Appeals
from the protective order entered by the Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County, the
Honorable K. L. Mclff, presiding, on February 19,2003. Respondent's motion for a new trial
pursuant to R59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was denied. The order denying the motion was
entered April 17,2003.
Dated this f^dzy

of.

_, 2003.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this,
lis f^dayof

lOilcJ

_ , 2003,1 hereby certify that I caused a correct copy

of the foregoing, Notice of Appeal, to be mailed, First Class postage pre-paid, to:
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY
"Attorney at Law
Counsel for petitioner, Billie R. Gill
1" South Main, Suite 205
PO Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642
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